Article

GDPR takes flight

GDPR takes flight
Photo by Remedy / Unsplash

A horse-racing millionaire and his helicopter, investigative journalists publishing hard-hitting articles, and a lawsuit. It sounds like the latest John Grisham legal thriller, but it is merely one of the most recent cases before the Belgian Data Protection Authority (DPA). Who says privacy is boring?

The context of the case is relatively simple: by linking and disseminating flight data with information about the owner of a helicopter, a data platform violated the GDPR. At the same time, another game is being played: a millionaire unhappy with investigative journalism that revealed he was having himself flown around in his helicopter without the necessary permits, where the information from the platform was used to publish about these indiscretions.

The latter raises an interesting question: how should we deal with the use or abuse of legislation to intimidate unwelcome investigations? Interesting as it may be, that question falls outside the DPA’s remit. A question that does fall within the DPA’s remit is whether the millionaire has a point, and whether the processing of his data breached the GDPR’s principles. Interesting questions for privacy professionals, and the added spice of millionaires and intrigue is a nice extra.

Personal Data

The DPA briefly pays homage to a list of classic hits in the “what is personal data?” genre: Scania, Breyer, and OC v European Commission. It concludes that flight data from a helicopter used almost exclusively to transport the millionaire in question are indeed personal data. It is trivial to link the helicopter to the millionaire’s company and identify the individual behind the company, and the data platform also made that information available in the paid section of its platform. The Swedish authority had already concluded in a similar case, in consultation with other European supervisory authorities, that flight data are personal data, which may have made the DPA’s conclusion that much easier.

Speaking of personal data, the DPA does not name the parties in its decision and, as always, tries to anonymise it. However, the combination of various details is so obvious that I feel fairly confident in concluding that the complainant is horse-racing millionaire Stephan Conter whose helicopter adventures were discussed at length in, among other places, De Standaard. The respondent is Jetnet, the American owner of the ADS-B data platform adsbexchange.com. Its mission statement is so similar to the description of the data platform’s activities in this case that it cannot be a coincidence. Anonymisation is exceptionally difficult in an age when the seemingly endless amount of information on the internet is so easy to search and link. Incidentally, that is also why the Dutch government’s rechtspraak.nl website, which publishes court decisions, has for some time referred to pseudonymising its publications rather than claiming to anonymise them.

SRB Desperation

In this case, I also noticed a manoeuvre typical of controllers (or rather, their lawyers) that we have been seeing more often for over a year now: desperately trying to drag in the SRB case law to support the argument that the data really aren’t personal data after all (for example, IQVIA before the CNIL). I have argued before that SRB is very interesting as confirmation of the fundamental principle that whether data are personal is relative, but the facts of the case itself have little practical application for privacy professionals. The measures SRB took to anonymise its data (for example, the way access to data and teams were separated within the organisation) are so specific to the context of the processing in that case that we are unlikely to see the same approach applied elsewhere. The DPA also seems to have had enough of the SRB hype, concluding that the respondent’s arguments were artificial particularly since, beyond making general references, it never explained concretely what measures it had actually taken that were comparable to those in the SRB case.

Territorial Scope and Legal Basis

Jetnet briefly seemed to want to rely on its status as an American company, and on the fact that it does not offer services to the individuals whose data it processes (GDPR Article 3(2)(a)), in an attempt to argue that the GDPR did not apply. But when a non-European company tracks an individual’s movements using flight data and GPS coordinates, Article 3(2)(b) comes into play, and the GDPR therefore applies. That assessment would have been considerably simpler here than the similar but more complex discussion in the Lusha case before the Garante.

Now that we know the data are personal data and that the GDPR applies, we also know that the controller in this case needs a legal basis. It goes without saying that the millionaire in question did not give consent, so we quickly arrive at the most commonly used legal basis under the GDPR: legitimate interest.

As is customary for the Belgian authority, the DPA neatly works through the three-part test from the RIGAS judgment: the interest, the necessity of the processing in relation to that interest, and the balancing exercise between the controller’s rights and the individual’s rights. The DPA moves through this fairly quickly in this case and sees few problems with relying on that legal basis. The millionaire made a half-hearted attempt to argue that publication posed security risks, but offered no facts to support that claim, leaving the DPA with little to go on.

Right to Information and Erasure

Since the data platform had always hoped to argue that it did not process personal data, it should come as no surprise that it had not put much effort into informing the data subject. In light of everything above, it is clear that they should have done so, as provided for in Article 14, which applies when data have not been obtained directly from the data subject. Since the data platform processed both the complainant’s phone number and email address, it was also clear to the DPA that the platform could not rely on the exception to the information obligation for cases where contacting the data subject proves too difficult.

Relying on legitimate interest also gives the data subject the right to object, and the millionaire was keen to exercise that right. A controller may invoke compelling legitimate grounds that override it and the data platform made a valiant attempt, arguing that it served the interests of aviation safety and provided crucial information for investigative journalism. It even brought national security into the argument. Nice try, Jetnet, but your raison d’être is hardly anything nobler than making money by processing data. Which is fine, but the DPA was clearly not impressed by the platform’s attempts to make itself seem more important than it is. The contact details and flight data should therefore have been erased.

Conclusion

It may be an acquired taste, but I always enjoy delving into a DPA case where the context makes it just that little bit juicier. It is also always useful to see how an authority assesses the facts, and the DPA’s extensive publication of decisions, unlike some other authorities (j’accuse AP), is extremely valuable. That said, I also draw a few practical takeaways for privacy professionals from this case:

  1. Don’t panic when someone waves the SRB case around again. There is a good chance it is completely irrelevant to the context you are dealing with.
  2. If you want to cite something in your defence, support it with real arguments, not vague references. Facts please!
  3. There is nothing wrong with making money by selling data. Commercial activity can be a legitimate interest, but remember that you can quickly lose out when someone exercises their right to object and has good reasons for doing so. Erasing the data promptly when it is clear that you should do so can prevent complaints and/or lawsuits.
  4. If you have direct contact details, such as an email address, you will pretty much never be able to rely on the exception in Article 14(5)b.

Edit 10/11/2026: I received some feedback on this post and my assessment, by someone familiar with the matter so in the interest of fairness I paraphrase the feedback. Their feedback concerned the following points:

  • In the Swedish decision the erasure of data was not required as the IMY recognised that some parties do not have access to the data through other channels. While the DPA follows the decision of the IMY, it does not follow that aspect.
  • The 95% reference was not mentioned during the hearing and only appeared later on, and was accepted without evidence.
  • The decision does not fully include actual benefits for certain third parties that use the real-time information for safety reasons and have no other place to get that information.
  • SRB was discussed at length in conclusions and the hearing, even though it receives almost no attention in the decision as it was published.

This decision will clearly be appealed at the Market Court, so time will tell!